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n  an  important  test  for  democracy,  Georgia  and  Ukraine  will  go  to  the  polls  for 
parliamentary elections on the 1st and 28th of October, respectively. The political leaders 
of  these  two  Eastern  Partnership  countries  have  committed  themselves  to  European 
values  and  principles  –  rhetorically. In  reality,  the  promise  of  their  colour  revolutions  is 
unrealised and they have shifted further towards authoritarianism, albeit following different 
paths in their respective post-revolution periods. Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili has 
championed  a  number  of  important  reforms  such  as  fighting  criminality  and  improving 
public sector services. But democracy is in decline in the country, with an increasingly over-
bearing government, a weak parliament, non-independent judiciary and semi-free media. 
Unlike  Saakashvili,  who  is  still  at  the  helm  of  Georgian  politics,  the  protagonists  of  the 
Ukrainian  revolution  have  either  been  imprisoned  (Yulia  Tymoshenko)  or  discredited 
(Viktor  Yushchenko).  President  Yushchenko’s  attempts  to  neutralise  his  former 
revolutionary ally Tymoshenko resulted in the electoral victory of Viktor Yanukovych in 
2010, who was quick to consolidate his reign.   
An uneven playing field  
The parliamentary elections in Georgia come at a critical juncture for the country, because 
the constitutional changes to be enforced in 2013 significantly increase the powers of the 
prime minister – effectively transforming this election into ‘king-maker’.  
If  the  Ukrainian  president  is  to  secure  a  constitutional  majority  in  parliament,  there  are 
indications that Yanukovych will push for an amendment to enable presidential election by 
parliament rather than by direct popular vote. This would allow Yanukovych to abolish term 
limits altogether and also to avoid possible defeat in the 2015 presidential elections.  
Recent legislative amendments in both Georgia and Ukraine have laid the ground for the 
forthcoming  parliamentary  elections.  The  reintroduction  of  the  mixed  proportional  and 
majoritarian representation system in both countries favours the incumbent parties, which 
are  in  a  stronger  position  to  secure  the  support  of  elected  officials.  Georgia’s  electoral 
constituency map is also drawn up to blight the opposition. The Ukrainian Democratic Alliance 
for  Reform  and  Svoboda  (Freedom)  opposition  parties  were  not  allocated  a  single 
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representative seat in any of the 225 electoral district commissions, and raising the threshold 
to 5% for parties to enter the Parliament is detrimental to all the smaller parties.  
The judiciary, administrative resources and the media 
Besides tampering with the electoral rules, Saakashvili and Yanukovych have utilised the 
entire state apparatus to their benefit. Their administrations have consistently manipulated 
key components of any democracy, namely the judiciary, the civil service and the media.  
Political competition in both countries has been stifled by selective justice at the behest of the 
government. In Georgia, the courts colluded in depriving the opposition leader, billionaire 
Bidzina Ivanishvili, of Georgian citizenship, after he announced his intention to stand for 
election. Only after special legal amendments had been passed was he allowed to take part in 
the elections. Georgian authorities also seized the opportunity to fine Ivanishvili for millions 
of dollars. In Ukraine, Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, the jailed opposition leaders, were 
denied the right to register for election by the Central Election Commission. A number of 
other Ukrainian opposition figures, such as Arsen Avakov, are in exile and thus unable to 
campaign. 
Both  the  Georgian  and  Ukrainian  governments  have  made  use  of  administrative  and 
budgetary  resources  to  manipulate  the  electoral  choices  of  the  population.  Saakashvili’s 
‘libertarian’ government increased public spending for social security programmes ahead of 
the elections. Every Georgian family is expected to receive 1000 lari (about €470) to spend on 
utilities  or  education  in  the  next  four years.  Similarly,  in  April  2012, Yanukovich  signed 
amendments  to  the  2012  budget  increasing  social  programme  expenditure  by  33  billion 
hryvnia (about €4 billion). Moreover, in both countries, the police services, local authorities 
and tax collectors have been instrumentalised to generate votes for the incumbents through 
intimidation, fines and arrests. 
The media is effectively gagged in both countries. Most television channels in Georgia are 
under  government  control,  with  the  exception  of  TV  channel  Maestro.  However,  the 
government  has  made  it  difficult  both  for  Maestro  and  Info  9,  a  channel  owned  by 
opposition leader Ivanishvili, to reach viewers. Newspapers and online media are relatively 
free; but the overwhelming majority of the population, especially in remote areas, relies on 
television  for  information  about  politics.  As  in  Georgia,  the  Ukrainian  opposition’s  TVi 
channel, which has been critical of the government’s policies, was squeezed out of the cable 
networks, and its director persecuted. And when journalists attempted to protest against the 
authorities at the recent World Newspaper Forum in Kiev, they were brutally silenced by the 
guards  of  President Yanukovich. Furthermore,  the  amendments  to  the Criminal  Code  to 
recriminalise libel proposed by the ruling party are likely to further curb freedom of speech 
in Ukraine.  
Civic activism 
Civil society actors have played an important role in monitoring the electoral process and 
have called the authorities in Ukraine and Georgia to account, sometimes at great personal 
risk. Georgian civil society recovered somewhat after losing its prominent members to the 
government following the revolution; a number of NGOs united around the “It Affects You 
Too” campaign to monitor the electoral process and regularly exposed violations, especially 
in  the  application  of  electoral  law.  In  Ukraine  a  coalition  called  Chesno!  (Fair)  has  been 
analysing the electoral candidate lists and discloses information about them to the public.  
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What response from the EU? 
For years, the EU has been caught between the unwillingness of Georgian and Ukrainian 
authorities  to  pursue  genuine  democratic  reforms  and  its  own  inability  to  send  a  clear 
message  on  the  democratic  backslide  in  these  countries,  although  in  recent  months,  EU 
leaders responsible for external relations have been more vocal in addressing this issue. The 
EU’s reaction to the changed law on the functioning of the Prosecutor’s office in Ukraine is 
indicative  of  the  trend.  However,  EU  disapprobation  appears  to  have  done  little  to 
discourage adverse trends in the run-up to the elections. In the face of various pre-election 
irregularities  and  suspected  wrongdoings  before  and  possibly  during  the  elections,  and 
assuming that the presidential coalitions will maintain their majorities, the EU should brace 
itself for a damning assessment by the OSCE’s election monitoring mission. If, indeed, the 
OSCE confirms that elections in both countries were neither (entirely) free nor fair, a difficult 
chapter of the EU’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine is likely to begin, probably spurred 
by street protests in both countries. 
In  October  and  November,  the  EU  Foreign  Affairs  Council  will  assess  the  elections  in 
Georgia and Ukraine. If and when the scenario outlined above materialises, the EU may first 
have  to  further  delay  the  ratification  of  the  Association  Agreement  and  the  Deep  and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Ukraine and slow down negotiations on the same 
agreements  with  Georgia.  Second,  the  conclusion  of  a  visa  facilitation  agreement  with 
Ukraine, which has been held up so as not to influence the outcome of the elections, could be 
frozen for a longer period of time. The ongoing negotiations about visa liberalisation with 
Georgia might also be prolonged. Finally, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument’s  conditionality  could  be  triggered,  with  the  EU  decreasing  the  financial  and 
technical assistance to both countries. While unpopular with certain member states of the 
EU, these moves will be necessary if the EU is serious about promoting certain values and 
principles in its relations with neighbouring countries. 